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Putting New Economic Geography to the Test:
Free-ness of Trade and Agglomeration in the EU Regions
Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Marc Schramm
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Abstract
Based on a new economic geography model by Puga (1999), we use the equilibrium wage
equation to estimate two key structural model parameters for the NUTS II EU regions. The
estimation of these parameters enables us to come up with an empirically based free-ness of
trade parameter. We then confront the empirically grounded free-ness of trade parameter with
the theoretical relationship between this parameter and the degree of agglomeration. This is
done for two versions of our model: one in which labor is immobile between regions, and one
in which labor is mobile between regions. Overall, and in line with related studies, our main
finding is that agglomeration forces still have only a limited geographical reach in the EU.
Agglomeration forces appear to be rather localized.
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1 Brakman: Dept. of Economics, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands;
Garretsen and Schramm: Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.
Brakman and Garretsen are also affiliated with the Radboud University Nijmegen and as research fellows with
CESifo, Munich and HWWA, Hamburg. Send correspondence to s.brakman@eco.rug.nl.
Revised version of a paper presented at the HWWA conference “New Economic Geography-Closing the Gap
between Theory and Empirics”, October 14-15 2004, Hamburg. This paper builds upon research carried out in
collaboration with the Netherlands’ Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) in The Hague. We would like to
thank our discussant Thierry Mayer, Maarten Bosker, Matthieu Crozet, Joeri Gorter, Albert van der Horst, Thijs
Knaap, Charles van Marrewijk and Diego Puga for comments and suggestions. We also would like to thank
Steven Poelhekke for excellent research assistance.2
1. Introduction
In his review of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), but in fact of the whole New
Economic Geography (NEG) literature, Neary (2001) reminds us that the real test for the
NEG is go beyond mere theory and to bring out its empirical and policy relevance. This paper
addresses the empirical relevance of the NEG. In doing so, we take the basic message of
Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p.1341), “estimate don’t test” seriously. We will show the
usefulness of the NEG, but we will not really test it against alternative theories, though we
will control for fixed “1
st nature” endowments and, indirectly, for human capital or (pure)
technological externalities. We also take their second message seriously and that is “don’t
treat theory too casually”. For this paper their advice means that our empirical analysis is well
grounded in NEG theory and that, in turn, we will explicitly address the theoretical
implications of the empirical findings.
Estimations that take the NEG as a starting point often run into problems. It is well-known
that agglomeration patterns can be found at all levels of aggregation (country, region, city).
But this not necessarily implies that neo-classical theories of location are without merit.
Geographical concentration of factor endowments or pure technological externalities could
lead to agglomeration in neo-classical models. In the same vein, the absence of agglomeration
does not imply that the NEG models are not relevant. NEG models are characterized by
multiple equilibria, of which the symmetric or spreading equilibrium is one. In addition, one
could point out that the application of these models to different economies with different
(labour market) institutions (like the USA or the EU countries), or to different geographical
scales (country versus city level) sits uneasy with the tendency in empirical NEG applications
of a ´one size fits all’ approach. Finally, from a more methodological angle, there are
important questions about the (spatial) econometrics involved as well as about data
measurement (see Combes and Overman, 2003). The conclusion is that the same empirical
facts about agglomeration can be explained using different theoretical approaches. On the one
hand this is good news, because it means that the facts are not in search of a theory. On the
other hand it leaves unanswered the question as to the relevance of NEG and, within NEG, as
to the relevance of specific NEG models. Recent theoretical work by Robert-Nicoud (2004)
and Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2004) also emphasizes these problems.3
In this paper we will address some of the above issues. More in particular, based on a NEG
model (Puga, 1999), we derive the equilibrium wage equation and estimate this equation. This
procedure gives estimates of two key structural model parameters for our sample of the NUTS
II EU regions, and it enables us to derive empirically based estimates for the so-called free-
ness of trade parameter. In doing so we follow the suggestion by Head and Mayer (2004a, p.
2663), who state that for future NEG empirics to progress “it is critical to identify the free-
ness of trade”. To our knowledge this is the first paper that tries to do so systematically.
Subsequently, we will use the estimates of this empirical exercise to find out for the case of
the EU regions what the free-ness of trade estimates imply for the degree and geographical
range of agglomeration forces.
2 Using the model by Puga (1999) as our benchmark model, we
confront our estimates of the free-ness of trade parameter with the theoretical relationship
between this parameter and the degree of agglomeration. Our results will be applied to two
different settings: one in which labor is immobile between regions, and one in which labor is
mobile between regions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic model is briefly presented and the
equilibrium wage equation is derived and this equation is the vehicle for our empirical
analysis. In terms of long-run equilibria section 3 describes two worlds that are consistent
with this wage equation, but have different predictions as to what happens with the degree of
agglomeration when trade costs fall. The first world is described by the now familiar
Tomahawk diagram that is not only to be found in the core NEG model by Krugman (1991)
but essentially in a very broad class of NEG models (Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2004).
With two regions there is a symmetric or spreading equilibrium and there are two equilibria
consistent with complete agglomeration. Ever-increasing economic integration will ultimately
result in complete agglomeration in this model. In the second world the possible set of long-
run equilbria is richer and (stable) incomplete agglomeration may belong to the set of long-
run equilbria. Here, for high levels of economic integration agglomeration will turn into
(renewed) spreading.
Section 4 presents our basic estimation results. Our estimation of the equilibrium wage
equation yields coefficients for the transport cost parameter and the substitution elasticity and
thereby, for any given distance between a pair of regions, an estimate for the free-ness of
2 Note that by doing so we address two from the five empirical hypotheses that, according to Head and Mayer
(2004a) follow from the NEG literature.4
trade parameter. Subsequently, section 5 confronts the findings of section 4 with our
benchmark model. Analysing the break conditions of each model gives an indication whether
or not more economic integration will lead to more agglomeration. By using bilateral country
trade data section 6 extends the analysis to the sectoral level. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Overall, our main finding is that agglomeration forces do not extend very far. Agglomeration
forces appear to be rather localized.
2 The Model and the Wage Equation
In this section we give a brief description of the model and focus on the derivation of the
equilibrium wage equation. The model we use encompasses the two most important NEG
models: the Krugman (1991) model with inter-regional labor mobility, and the Krugman and
Venables (1995) model without inter-regional labor mobility. We take Puga (1999) as a
starting point because he presents a general model that encompasses these two core models
and in fact many other NEG models as special cases. The model without interregional labor
mobility is considered to be more relevant in an international context, because it is a stylised
fact that labor is internationally less mobile than nationally. For the EU, however, it is not a
priori clear if this is true in the long run. Economic integration could stimulate international
labor mobility. In the context of NEG such a gradual change to more labor mobility can have
serious implications, as we will discuss below. We will now introduce and summarize the
basic set-up of the Puga model (for more details see, besides Puga (1999), also Fujita,
Krugman, and Venables (1999), Chapter 14).
Demand
Assume an economy with two sectors, a numéraire sector (H), and a Manufacturing (M)
sector. As a short cut one often refers to H as the agricultural sector to indicate that this
industry is tied to a specific location. Every consumer in the economy shares the same, Cobb-
Douglas, preferences for both types of commodities:
) 1 ( δ δ − = H M U
The parameter δ is the share of income spent on manufactured goods. M is a CES sub-utility

















Maximizing the sub-utility subject to the relevant income constraint, that is the share of
income that is spent on manufactures, δE, gives the demand for each variety, j:5
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substitution, and E=i n c o m e .
Firms also use varieties from the M sector as intermediate inputs. Assuming that all varieties
are necessary in the production process and that the elasticity of substitution is the same for
firms as for consumers, we can use the same CES-aggregator function for producers as for
consumers, with the same corresponding price index, I. Given spending on intermediates, we
can derive demand functions for varieties of producers which are similar to those of
consumers.
Total demand for a variety, j, can now be represented as:
(3) Y I p c j j
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where Y is defined as
* npx E Y µ δ + = . The first term on the right hand side of Y comes from
consumers, representing the share of income E that is spent on all M-varieties, the second
term on the right hand site comes from firm demand for intermediate inputs, this is equal to
the value of all varieties in a region, npx*, multiplied by the share of intermediates in the
production process, µ (see below).
Manufacturing Supply
Next, turn to the supply side. Each variety,i , is produced according to the following cost
function, C(xi):
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where the coefficients α and β describe, the fixed and marginal input requirement per variety.
The input is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor, with price (wages) W, and intermediates,
represented by the price index I. Maximizing profits gives the familiar mark-up pricing rule
(note that marginal costs consists of two elements, labor and intermediates):
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Using the zero profit condition, ) (
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− , and the mark-up pricing rule (5),
gives the break- even supply of a variety i (each variety is produced by a single firm):
(6)
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Equilibrium with transportation costs in the 2 region model
Furthermore, transportation of manufactures is costly. Transportation costs T are so-called
iceberg transportation costs: T12>1 units of the manufacturing good have to be shipped from
region 1 to region 2 for one unit of the good to actually arrive in region 2. Assume, for
illustration purposes, that the two regions - 1 and 2 - are the only regions. Total demand for a
product from, for example region 1, now comes from two regions, 1 and 2. The consumers
and firms in region 2 have to pay transportation costs on their imports. This leads to the
following total demand for a variety produced in region 1:
1
2 12 1 2
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We already know that the break-even supply equals
β
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= x , equating this to total
demand gives (note that the demand from region 2 is multiplied by T12 in order to compensate
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Inserting the mark-up pricing rule, (5), in this last equation and solving for the wage rate gives
the two-region version of the wage equation in the presence of intermediate demand for
varieties.
3 This version of the NEG model is also known as the vertical linkages model,
because this model introduces an extra agglomeration force: the location of firms has an
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where the constant, Const, is a function of (fixed) model parameters.
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Wr is the region’s r (nominal) wage rate, Ys is expenditures (demand for final consumption
and intermediate inputs), Is is the price index for manufactured goods, ε is the elasticity of
substitution for manufactured goods and Trs are the iceberg transport costs between regions r
3 The reason to derive a wage equation instead of a traditional equilibrium price equation is twofold. First, labor
migration between regions is a function of (real) wages, second, data on regional wages are easier to obtain than
regional manufacturing price data, see section 4.7
and s. Note that when we want to estimate wage equation (7) for our sample of NUTSII EU
regions we need to come up with a specification of the transport costs Trs ,t h i sw i l lb ed o n ei n
section 4. In particular we will have the answer the question how transport costs vary with the
distance between regions. In the short-run, when the spatial distribution of firms and labor is
fixed, the model reduces to three equations with three unknowns (wages W,e x p e n d i t u r e sY,
and the price index I). In the long-run the spatial distribution of economic activity is
endogenous because then footloose firms and, depending on the particular version of the
model used, manufacturing workers can move between sectors and regions.
Equation (7) closely resembles the “old-fashioned” market potential function. Regional wages
are higher in regions that have easy access to high-wage regions nearby. This is reflected by
the term YTrs
(1-ε), known as nominal market access (Redding and Venables, 2003). Wages
are also higher when there is less competition, this is the extent of competition effect,
measured by the price index Is. Note, that the price index Is does not measure a competition
effect in the sense in which this term is normally used (price are fixed mark-ups over marginal
costs and there is no strategic interaction between firms). A low price index reflects that many
varieties are produced in nearby regions and are therefore not subject to high transportation
costs, this reduces the level of demand for local manufacturing varieties. Since firms’ output
level and price mark-up are fixed, this has to be off set by lower wages. Hence, a low (high)
price index Is depresses (stimulates) regional wages Wr. The inclusion of the price index in the
market access term in the wage equation is important since it makes clear that we are dealing
with real market access (RMA) as opposed to the gravity equation or market potential
function where typically only nominal market access matters.
Finally, the term I
-µ/(1-µ) in wage equation (7), is known as supplier access, SA (Redding and
Venables, 2003). A lower value of I, lowers production costs and allows a higher break-even
wage level. Supplier access means that when the price index is low (high), intermediate input-
supplying firms are relatively close (far) to your location of production, which strengthens
(weakens) agglomeration. A better supplier access (a lower value of I) lowers wage costs.
This effect is stronger the larger the share of intermediate products, µ, in the production
process. Note that with µ=0 (no intermediate inputs) only the real market access term is left
in the wage equation.8
Wage equation (7) will do for our empirical purposes.
4 In the short-run when the spatial
distribution of fims and workers is fixed, demand differences between regions will be fully
reflected in regional wage differences. Or, in other words, regional differences in real market
access, RMA, and supplier access, SA, (both of which are fixed in the short run) will result in
regional wage differences. In the long run when firms and workers can move, these
differences will also give rise to re-location of firms and workers (which amounts to saying
that in the long run RMA and SA are endogenous).
5 All that matters for our empirical analysis
is that wage equation (7) is the equilibrium wage equation and can be estimated. However, to
learn more about the relationship between economic integration and agglomeration the wage
equation will not do and we have to address the nature of the long-run equilibria.
3 The relation between economic integration and agglomeration
6
Interregional Labor Mobility: the Tomahawk
NEG models that have the same set-up as Puga (1999) predict that with interregional labor
mobility economic integration will lead to complete agglomeration of the footloose agents in
the end. The intuition behind this is simple and is illustrated, for the two region case in Figure
1. Assume that there are two regions. Economic integration implies lower transportation costs.
In Figure 1 this is a movement from left to right along the horizontal axis, from low to high
φ’s (more on the important role of φ below). The parameter φ is called the free-ness of trade
or “phi-ness” of trade parameter (Baldwin et al, 2003) and, in terms of our model, is defined
as φrs≡Trs
1-ε It is easy to interpret: φrs =0 denotes autarky and the absence of economic
integration whereas φrs =1 denotes free trade and full economic integration between regions r
and s. In empirical work this gives an extra degree of freedom: one has to choose a functional
form for Trs. The vertical axis in Figure 1 shows the share of the footloose production factor in
region 1.
Assume that the initial situation is one of autarky (φ = 0) and that (footloose) labor is equally
distributed over the two regions, indicated by the horizontal solid line at ½. Because the
4 This has an additional advantage in that we do not have to consider the long-run adjustment mechanism, that is,
whether or not firms are mobile or instead labor (see Puga, 1999, p. 310).
5 Whether or not in the long run both prices (here, wages) and quantities (here, mobile firms and workers) act as
adjustment mechanism, depends on the inter-sectoral elasticity of manufacturing labour supply (see Head and
Mayer, 2004b). With an infinite elastic labour supply all the adjustment has to come from the quantity side (and
there will be no regional wage differences). In case, as we will assume too, of a postively sloped labour supply
function to the relative (=manufacturing/agricultural) wage at least part of the adjustment will come through
regional wages, see the next section for an analysis of this issue.
6 Our discussion in this section is based on the 2 core NEG models as discussed in Puga (1999), but compare
also Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Chapters 4 and 5 with Chapter 14.9
regions are identical this situation is also a long-run equilibrium. This is why this situation is
known as the symmetric or spreading equilibrium. What happens if the degree economic
integration increases, that is moving from left to right in the Figure? Mobile workers have to
decide if re-locating to the other region, say from region 1 to 2 (that becomes slightly larger
than region 1), is beneficial for them. Initially, re-locating is not beneficial because
transportation costs are still quite high and relocating means that exporting from region 2 to
region 1 is still too expensive. Furthermore, competition in region 2 increases. This implies
that prices and wages in region 2 have to go down in order to be able to sell the break-even
amount. A defecting worker will return to its original location. But if transportation costs
decline beyond a certain point, the advantages of moving to region 2, outweighs the
disadvantage of exporting to region 1. This stimulates further migration towards region 2 until
all workers and firms have moved towards this region. Figure 1, the tomahawk-figure, gives
the theoretical relationship between economic integration φ and the degree of agglomeration.
Figure 1 The tomahawk
As Figure 1 illustrates the point where it becomes profitable to agglomerate is indicated by
φ
B, in the literature this point is known as the so-called break point: the point where the
symmetric equilibrium (degree of agglomeration = ½ ) is no longer a stable equilibrium
(indicated by the dashed horizontal line). At this point the re-location decision of a worker
means that others will follow, triggering a process of agglomeration. So, in our NEG model



























agglomeration as a long-run equilibrium. Analysing the effects of increasing economic
integration on agglomeration is now reduced to the question where an economy is located on
the horizontal axis in Figure 1, that is, one is interested in whether or not an economy is in
actual fact to the left or to right of φ
B.
7 Where we are on the horizontal is an empirical
question to which the estimations of the free-ness of trade parameter based wage equation will
give us the answer in sections 4 and 5. Furthermore, the estimates for φ help us to infer φ
B.
Puga (1999, eq. 16) derives the following analytical solution for the break-point for the 2
region case (dropping subscripts r and s):
(8)
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The elasticity η is the elasticity of a region’s labor supply from the H-sector to the
manufacturing sector. If η = 0, no inter-sector labor mobility is possible, if η = ∞ there is
perfect labor mobility between sectors, that is to say the inter-sectoral labor supply elasticity
is infinite. In the latter case wages in the manufacturing sector and the H-sector are identical
until a region becomes specialized in manufactures. If 0 < η < ∞ migration from the H-sector
to the manufacturing sector can be consistent with a wage increase in both sectors. The
inclusion of an upward sloping labor supply function thus implies that the model is more
general than Krugman (1991, where η = 0), or Krugman and Venables (1995, where η = ∞).
Most importantly, if 0 < η < ∞, the bang-bang long run solutions as in Tomahawk model
might disappear once we do no longer allow for inter-regional labor mobility. This is
discussed next.
No interregional labor mobility: the Bell-Shaped Curve
How relevant is the Tomahawk Figure for the analysis of EU integration and agglomeration?
In international trade theory it is standard to assume that labour is mobile between sectors, but
not across national borders. This assumption reflects the stylised fact that labour is less mobile
across borders than within regions or countries. Without interregional labour mobility
agglomeration, however, is still possible (see Krugman and Venables, 1995, Puga, 1999,
Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).
7 For the purpose of this paper the sustain point, φ
S is deemed not relevant under the assumption that we are only
interested in the case where we move from less to more economic integration, that is, we only move from left to
right along the horizontal axis in Figure 1. The characteristics of break and sustain points are analysed in detail
by, for example, Neary (2001), Robert-Nicoud (2004) and Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2004).11
The absence of interregional labour mobility still allows agglomeration in the presence of
intermediate goods. Firms may find it to be advantageous to agglomerate because of
intermediate input linkages, they want to be near the suppliers of these inputs, recall the
discussion about the supplier access term in wage equation (7) from the previous section. The
labor required to sustain the agglomeration of firms comes from the immobile H sector. To
persuade workers to move from the H-sector to the manufacturing sector, each firm has to
offer workers in this sector a higher wage than the existing wage in this sector: the more
inelastic labour supply is to manufacturing wages, the higher this wage offer has to be.
Agglomeration in this class of NEG models, and opposed to the case where the Tomahawk
Figure applies, is associated with increasing wage differences between regions.I nt h e
peripheral region, wages decrease, because once firms agglomerate in the more attractive
region, labor that is released in the manufacturing sector, increases labour supply in the
agricultural sector.
T h ep o i n tt oe m p h a s i z eh e r ei st h a t( w i t h0 < η<∞) agglomeration drives up wages in the core
region. This ultimately reduces the incentive for firms in the manufacturing sector to
concentrate production in the region where manufacturing economic activity is agglomerated
for a number of reasons. First, an increased demand for labor raises production costs in the
region where manufacturing is concentrated. Second, the importance of being close to a
specific market diminishes as transportation costs become less important due to increased
economic integration, that is when φ, the degree of economic integration, increases. Third, the
peripheral region, with its lower wage rate becomes more and more attractive.
Without interregional labor mobility the long-run relationship between the free-ness of trade
(economic integration) and agglomeration might look like Figure 2 which has aptly been
called the bell shaped curve by Head and Mayer (2004a).
8 As in Figure 1 for the 2 region
case we have φ on the horizontal axis and the degree of concentration on the vertical axis. For
low degrees of economic integration (to the left of φ
B
low) we have spreading and similar to the
8 It might but it need not, this depends on exact parameter configuration, see the Appendix in Puga (1999) or
Robert-Nicoud (2004). The point to emphasize is that what really distinguishes Figure 2 from Figure 1 is that
once agglomeration has arrived the economy will stay in the agglomeration regime in Figure 1as economic
increases further whereas in Figure 2 for high levels of economic integration (high levels of φ) agglomeration
will turn into (renewed) spreading. Here we assume that the latter possibility occurs with “smooth”, that is,
partial agglomeration, equilibria like depicted in Figure 2 but one can also come up with a double tomahawk
(Robert-Nicoud, 2004, p. 22-23) to depict this second possibility.12
previous section, once economic integration passes the break-point (here φ
B
low)ap r o c e s so f
agglomeration starts. The main difference with the previous model, is that agglomeration can
be partial and go along with interregional wage differences. If economic integration is pushed
far enough, a second(!) break point, denoted φ
B
high, will be reached. From φ
B
highonwards we
have re-newed spreading, no agglomeration is left whatsoever and interregional wages will
now be equal (because both regions will have the same number of manufacturing firms and an
equally sized manufacturing sector).
Figure 2 Bell-shaped curve




high are the (real) solutions to the quadratic equation in φ (Puga,
1999, equation (33)):
(9) [] [ ] [ ] [] {} ϕ γµ ε µ ε η µ ε ϕ γ µ η µ µ ε − − − − + − + − − + + + − + ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
2 2
[] 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − + − − − + γ η µ ε µ
If, depending on the exact parameter configuration for ε,γ, µ and η, these solutions exist, this
expression gives us the two break-points. To follow Head and Mayer (2004a) we would like
to answer the question for the case of the EU regions “where in the bell are we?” Finally, and





























1 versus Figure 2) only comes to the fore when we are dealing with long-run equilibria, the
equilibrium wage equation (7) is at home in both classes of NEG models. This means that our
estimations of the free-ness of trade parameter φ based on the equilibrium wage equation can
be confronted with the tomahawk figure as well as the above bell shaped curve!
4. The estimation of the wage equation
Before we can estimate wage equation (7) we have to take the following issues into account.
First, we have to specify the distance function. We considered two options:
•  Trs=T
Drs, where the transports costs increase exponentially with the distance
between r and s, and T represents the transport cost parameter that does not vary
with distance (applied by Hanson, 2001, Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm, 2004)
•  Trs=TDrs
γ , where the parameters T, γ >0(Crozet, 2004). The size of the distance
decay parameter γ needs to be estimated and the data will decide whether transport
costs rise or fall more or less than proportionally with increased distance between r
and s. If 0 < γ <1transport costs rise less than proportionally with distance, and
reflects that economies to scale (or distance) are possible with respect to
transportation.
We opted for the second possibility because in that case the data decide whether transport
costs rise or fall more or less than proportionally with increased distance between r and s. The
distance variable Drswill be measured in km. between NUTSII regions. The distance from a




which area is the size of region r in km
2, (see Head and Mayer, 2000 for a discussion of this
measure for internal distance). Given our specification for Trs we can calculate φrs ≡Trs
1-ε ,f o r
each combination of Drs and Drr..
A second issue that we need to address is that we cannot estimate equilibrium wage equation
(7) directly. There are no (sufficient) regional price index data for NUTSII regions and this
means that Ir cannot be measured as such. In addition, even if we somehow get around
measuring the regional price indices, the equilibrium price index is itself a function of the
regional wages Wr. As can already be guessed from equation (2), the equilibrium price index
in region r is also not only a function of wages in other regions but also of the price index in
other regions. This follows directly from the fact that in the model with intermediate inputs
firms there are 2 inputs (labor and manufacturing goods).14
This “price index” problem can be solved in two ways. First, as for instance shown by Hanson
(2001), one can make use of other equilibrium conditions (of a non-tradable service) to get rid
of the price index altogether. This has its drawbacks too. For the case of the EU regions this
leads to new data requirements that cannot (easily) be met. Also, this strategy may imply that
one needs additional assumptions that are troublesome for the present analysis (in particular
that interregional real wages are always equalized which clearly too strong an assumption to
make for the case of the EU regions). We can, in principle, express the price index in region r
as an average of the wage in region r and the wages in centre regions corrected for the
distance between region r and these centre regions (see the Appendix f o ra ne x p l a n a t i o na n d
further references).
9
As a third and final issue, we observe that regional wages across Europe may differ for
reasons that have nothing to do with the demand and cost linkages from the NEG literature.
This leads us to another issue that needs to be addressed. Positive human capital externalities
or (pure) technological externalities might also give rise to a spatial wage structure! These
externalities imply that regions may simply differ in terms of their marginal factor
productivity and this is something we would like to take into account when estimating the
wage equation. Also, the physical and political geography of Europe might be a factor in
explaining regional wage differences, these are the fixed endowments that are truly fixed
geographically (Combes and Overman, 2003).
To take these alternative explanations for regional wage differences on board as control
variables we proceeded as follows. We allow for labour productivity to differ across the EU
regions. We cannot measure human or technological externalities separately (due to lack of
relevant data on NUTSII level). The Appendix derives the corresponding equilibrium wage
equation once labour productivity is no longer assumed to be equal across regions. Relative
marginal labour productivity is [MPLEU /MPLr], where MPLEU is the average real gross value
added per employee in the NUTSII regions and MPLr is the real gross value added per
employee for region r. By allowing for MPL-differences the wage equation changes into:
9 Another solution to be able to estimate the wage equation if data on the price index I are lacking is to simply
assume that Ir=Is . This assumption (see Niebuhr, 2004 for an example) effectively boils down to stating that
only nominal market access matters, which is not relevant for our case.15
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where, MPL = marginal productivity of labor in a specific region (indicated by the subscript).
The possibility that the physical geography (climate, elevation, access to waterways etc.) or
the political geography (borders, country-specific institutional wage arrangements etc.) might
also explain regional wage differences will be addressed below. As proxies for physical
geography we will use for the NUTSII regions the mean annual sunshine radiation (in
kWH/m
2) and the mean elevation above sea level. We will also use dummy variables when a
region borders the sea, has direct access to (navigable) waterways, or is a border region. To
capture the possibility of country-specific determinants of wages (like the centralisation of
wage setting) we also use country-dummies as control variables. The physical and political
geography variables capture the fixed (= not man-made) features of the economic geography
that may have a bearing on regional wages. By fixed we mean that these variables are not
determined by the location decisions of mobile firms or workers.
10
The log-transformation of the equilibrium wage equation gives the specification that, see
wage equation below, actually has been used as the central wage equation in our estimations,
and by adding physical and political geography control variables we thus end up with:
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where ()
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ε γ ε − − = rs rs TD T and internal distance Drr= 0.667
π
area
in which area is the size
of region r in km
2 ;a n d Zi = set of additional control variables for each region that
potentially consists of mean annual sunshine; mean elevation above sea-level; and dummy
variables (country dummy, border-region dummy, access to sea dummy, access to navigable
waterway dummy), for more information on the data used and the definition of variables see
the Appendix
What is immediately apparent from the wage equation is that the supplier access (SA) term is
correlated with the real market access (RMA) term. The multicollinearity between RMA and
10 This is why we decided not use the regional production structure as control variable. In NEG models this is
clearly an endogenous variable. NEG models are all about the simultaneous determination of demand and
production across regions.16
SA is discussed at length by Redding and Venables (2003) and Knaap (2004), and it leads
these authors to opt for either SA or RMA in the actual estimations. We follow these authors
and opt thereby for RMA. In our case the lack of data on regional price indices makes this
choice rather straightforward! In some of our estimations we have, following Redding and
Venables (2003), experimented with including the distance of each region to the economic
centers as an (time-invariant) approximation for supplier access, this did, however, not affect
our main results. Implicitly we will assume that in our estimations SA is constant.
In addition, there are other econometric issues to be addressed like the endogeneity of the
variables (wages and income) that make up the real market access term (Hanson, 2001, Mion,
2003). We have estimated wage equation (7’) in levels and also, without the time-invariant
control variables, in 1
st differences. In doing so, we have also performed IV-estimations and
used both non-linear least squares (NLS) and weighted least squares (WLS). In particular,
when estimating in levels, the Glejser test indicated the presence heteroscedasticity so we
choose WLS. But for the sake of comparison (for instance with Crozet, 2004) we also present
the NLS regression. The sample period is 1992-2000. Our goal for this paper is not solve all
these econometrical issues since the estimation of the wage equation is only a means to an
end. The means is to arrive at “reasonable” estimates for the substitution elasticity ε and the
distance parameter γ so as to be able to infer the free-ness of trade parameter. Table 1 gives
the results of estimating equation (7’) in levels. The 1
st column gives the WLS results of
estimating (7’). The 2
nd column does the same but now the estimation is the second stage of a
2SLS regression where in the first stage regression wages and income were regressed upon
the exogenous controls Z, a time trend, and 1-period lagged wages or income. This is a simple
way to instrument wages and income. The third column shows the estimation results for a
2SLS regression of wage equation (7’) but now we use NLS instead of WLS.
To save space we only show the estimation results for our 2 key variables (results for other
variables and/or other specifications are available upon request).17
Table 1 Estimating Wage Equation (7’), 1992-2000 (t-values between brackets)













t-values for 2SLS have been corrected for the fact that fitted values for wages and income from the first stage
regression are included in the second stage. Number of obs.: 1
st column: 1830; 2
nd column: 1566
The coefficient for the substitution elasticity is relatively high (indicating relative weak
economies of scale) but many studies find values in the range of 7-11 (see for instance Broda
and Weinstein, 2004 for sectoral evidence for the USA or Hanson and Xiang, 2004 for recent
international evidence). The distance coefficient γ < 1 which indicates that transport costs
increases less than proportionally with distance (see Crozet 2004 for an opposite finding).
11
To be able to show what the estimations mean for the relationship between economic
integration and agglomeration, we need to go back to the underlying theoretical model as
introduced in sections 2 and 3, and in particular to Figures 1 and 2. In doing so, we take the
estimates of the second column of Table 1 as our empirical benchmark, ε=9.53, and γ=0.19.
Note that the various estimations of ε and γ yielded roughly the comparable results in terms of
the implied value of the free-ness of trade parameter.
12
5 Economic Integration and Agglomeration: φ meets φ
B
Given the estimates we are now ready to confront our estimations with the theoretical insights
with respect to the relationship between economic integration and agglomeration from section
3. In section 3 we explained that when it comes to this relationship we distinguish in this
paper between two relevant classes of NEG models. In our analysis based on Puga (1999), the
distinguishing feature between both classes was the assumption about interregional labour
mobility. With interregional labor mobility, full agglomeration is the only feasible outcome
11 Estimating in 1
st differences (in 2SLS) instead of in levels, gave significant (and correctly signed) results for ε
and γ too. But, more in line with Crozet, the substitution elasticity is much lower (between 2-3) and γ>1 (around
1.8). Our concern here is, however, not so much the estimated coefficients as such but their compound effect on
the free-ness of trade parameter φ. In this respect, the 1
st difference results yield a free-ness of trade parameter
that is very similar to the one based on the estimations in levels shown in Table 1.
12 As explained above, the inclusion of both the supplier access (SA) term and the real market access (RMA)
term in our estimation of (7’) is troublesome a priori, because of the expected degree of multicollinearity
between SA and RMA. Because of lack of data we cannot directly compute SA but, see the Appendix (equation
3’’), we can approximate the price index Ir for each region by filling the following values for γ (0.19) ε (9.53)
and, not based on estimations, µ (0.3). If we confront the resulting SA (= Ir
µ/(1-µ) ) with the RMA (the term in
(7’) we indeed find a high degree of correlation, 0.64.18
whenever the degree of economic integration passes a certain threshold level, recall the
Tomahawk Figure 1. In the absence of interregional labor mobility, agglomeration outcomes
are less extreme (partial agglomeration). More importantly, if the degree of economic
integration continues to increase the degree of agglomeration will diminish and ultimately the
economy returns to a spreading equilibrium, recall the bell-shaped curve from Figure 2.
Armed with our estimations for the structural parameters ε=9.53 and γ=0.19 for the EU
NUTSII regions, we would like to know what these estimations imply when confronted with
the tomahawk and bell-shaped Figures, that is when confronted with our NEG model. In this
way we are able to say more about the relationship between economic integration, here
proxied by φ, and the extent of agglomeration. The break-points φ
B for both the Tomahawk
and Bell Shaped Curve can be derived from equations (8) and (9). In order to be able to infer
for any pair of regions r and s with bilateral distance Drs the implied value for the free-ness of
trade parameter φrs b a s e do no u re s t i m a t e sf o rγ and ε,w eh a v et ot a k ei n t oc o n s i d e r a t i o nt h a t
the NUTSII regions are not of equal size and that therefore the internal distance Drr matters to
assess the free-ness of trade between a region r and any other region s. This is why the
associated value of φrs i si nf a c tam e a s u r eo fr e l a t i v ed i s t a n c eDrs/Drr and thereby of relative
transport costs Trs/Trr.
We dub the break-point φ
B
labmobfor the version of the NEG model with interregional labor
mobility, see equation (8). Given certain restrictions on the model parameters (see Puga
(1999), p.315), this break-point gives us the critical value of φ below which the symmetric
equilibrium (no agglomeration) is locally stable. If, however, φ> φ
B
labmob we have complete
agglomeration just like Figure 1 illustrates. Note, however, that due to presence of internal
distance we thus have to adjust the definition of φ
B a sf o l l o w s ,t h a ti sw eh a v et od e f i n et h e
free-ness of trade in terms of relative distance Drs/Drr (see Crozet, 2004, equation 16, p. 454















































The break-condition (8) is not affected by our particular definition of the free-ness of trade
parameter as given in equation (10), and this is also true for the break-condition (9). For the19
Bell Shaped Curve depicted by Figure 2, and provided that equation (9) gives us 2 real






nd breakpoint in Figure 2):
- for phi-values where φ < φ
B
low or φ > φ
B
high the spreading equilibrium is locally stable
(there is no agglomeration),
- for phi-values where φ
B
low< φ < φ
B
high, the economy is on the bell part of the bell-
shaped curve where the equilibria display (partial) agglomeration.





such not depend on the specification of the transport costs function. Given, see equations (8)
and (9), parameter values for µ,η,δ and ε, we can arrive at a specific value for the various
break points φ
B. If we then use this in equation (10) and also plug in our estimates for ε and γ,





that corresponds with the break
point. Comparing this threshold with the actual relative distance between regions r and s
provides then information as to the spatial reach of agglomeration forces.
Before we can confront our estimation results with the break-point conditions (8) and (9) and
taking into account that the definition of the free-ness of trade as given by equation (10), we
thus finally need some benchmark numbers for the parameters µ,η,δ (given that we already
have an estimate for ε). Recall that these 4 parameters suffice to yield the break-points for the
2 models. For the last parameter we can start with our own estimations for the substitution
elasticity (see Table 1) for the other three parameters we follow Puga (1999) and Head and
Mayer (2004a) and use as our benchmark values µ=0.3,η=200, δ=0.1. It is important to keep
in mind that the conclusions are of course sensitive to the choice of parameter values. Having
said this, an extensive sensitivity analysis showed that our main conclusions hold up for a
broad range of parameter values (not shown here but available upon request).
Table 2 gives for both the Tomahawk and Bell Curve and for a number of alternative






labmob respectively. That is to say, these
are the results for the break points when we apply the benchmark valus for the 4 parameters to
equations (8) and (9). Generally speaking it is true in both versions of the NEG model that the
range of values of φ for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable shrinks and, conversely,
for which (partial) agglomeration is stable expands whenever, ceteris paribus, µ,η,or δ get
larger and/or ε gets smaller (see also Puga, 1999, eq. 18). The economic intuition for this is
clear. If the importance of intermediate inputs in production increases (larger µ)i tg e t sm o r e20
attractive for firms to agglomerate in order to benefit from the intermediate cost and demand
linkages between firms as explained in section 3. If the elasticity of labour supply increases,
firms will find that relatively low manufacturing wages can already persuade workers to move
from the H-sector to the manufacturing sector. This decreases the strength of this congestion
or spreading force. Also, a larger expenditure share of manufacturing goods benefits
agglomeration because it increases the relevance of demand linkages. Finally, a lower value
for the substitution elasticity stimulates agglomeration. Note, that this elasticity provides a
measure of the (equilibrium) economies of scale, where the economies of scale are measured
as ε/(ε-1). A decrease of ε thus means an increased relevance of firm specific increasing
returns to scale which boosts agglomeration.
Table 2 The break-points for alternative parameter settings








Μ=0.2 ,η=200,δ=0.1, ε=9.53 0.55 0.77 0.20
Μ=0.2 ,η=200,δ=0.1 , ε=4 0.44 0.90 0.05
Μ=0.3 ,η=200, δ=0.1, ε=9.53 0.30 0.89 0.11
Μ=0.2 ,η=250,δ=0.1 , ε=9.53 0.51 0.83 0.18
Μ=0.2 ,η=200,δ=0.05, ε=9.53 0.55 0.77 0.33
Μ=0.1 ,η=200,δ=0.05 and ε=5 Symm Symm 0.52
Μ=0 ,η=0,δ=0.1 and ε=8 Symm Symm 0.65
Notes: symm indicates that the symmetric equilibrium is stable for all values of phi. The break-points are derived
for the case of n=2 regions. In case n>2, analytical solutions for the break-points do not exist unless, sse the
Appendix in Puga 1999, one sticks to the assumption of equidistance between all regions, see the main text for a
further discussion of this issue.
Table 2 gives rise to the following three conclusions.
-First, the values for the various break-points are indeed sensitive to the parameter settings
even though the direction of change can thus be predicted.
-Second, it matters whether one chooses the model version with or without interregional
labour mobility. As a rule, over the whole range of permissible φ’s, 0 < φ <1 ,t h e
agglomeration range is smaller (!) in the bell-shaped world than in the tomahawk world. Also,
the symmetric equilibrium gets unstable for lower values of φ.H e n c e ,ap r o c e s so fe c o n o m i c
integration gives rise more quickly to agglomeration in the model without interregional labour
mobility.21
-The third and, most important, conclusion relates for our set of benchmark parameters values
(see Table 2), the empirical estimates for the free-ness of trade parameter from Table 1 with
the break-conditions (8) and (9). With µ=0.3 , η=200, δ=0.1 and ε=9.53 (from Table 1,





=0.89 and, for the tomahawk, that φ
B
labmob =0.11. Combining this with our estimates of γ=0.19
and ε=9.53 we can derive the critical or threshold relative distance Drs/Drr that corresponds
with each of these 3 break-points.
From condition (9) or (8) we get values for φ
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φ and given our estimates for the distance parameter γ and the substitution
elasticity ε we get the hypothetical relative distance that corresponds with the break point.
More precisely we get for
•  φ
B
low =0.30 → Drs/Drr=2.08
•  φ
B
high =0.89 → Drs/Drr=1.07
•  φ
B
labmob =0.11 → Drs/Drr=3.84
These results imply that the agglomeration does not extend further than 1-4 times the internal
distance of a region. To see this, note that the average internal distance for the NUTSII regions
is 42 km. With this value for internal distance Drr we get from the perspective of region r a
“critical” or threshold external distance Drs for the model underlying the bell-shaped curve of
87.3 km. for φ
B
low a n d4 4 . 9k m .f o rφ
B
high. This means that for any actual Drs>87.3 km we are
in Figure 2 to the left of the first break-point where spreading rules. Along similar lines, it is
only when the actual Drs<44.9 km. that spreading rules again. In between, that is for 44.9
km<Drs<87.3 km, we are on the part of Figure 2 with (partial) agglomeration. For the
Tomahawk, Figure 1, the threshold external distance Drs=161 km. Here, the range or radius of
agglomeration forces is thus somewhat stronger but still rather limited if one considers the
fact that the distance between any pair of economic centres for the case of the EU NUTSII
regions is often much larger than 161 km. Figure 3 summarizes our findings.
13 The
conclusion about the rather limited spatial reach of agglomeration forces does not change
when we substitute our benchmark parameter values for one of the other possibilities shown
in Table 2. In most other cases and compared to our benchmark, the values for φ
B
low and
13 Our third conclusion is in line with the findings by Crozet, 2004, Table 6). He conducts a similar analysis the
major difference being that the break point analysis is limited to the Krugman (1991) model (the break condition
(8) with µ=η=0) and the fact that Crozet estimates his model for 5 EU countries (for each country separately).22
φ
B
labmob are higher which means that the threshold distance Drs beyond which agglomeration
forces are no longer present is even lower t h a nf o rt h es e to fb e n c h m a r kp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .
Figure 3 summarizes our findings. The top panel of Figure 3 gives for our three respective
break points the relative threshold distance Drs/Drr and the bottom panel does the same for the
external distance Drs under the assumption that the internal distance is 42 km.
Figure 3 Break points and threshold distances

















Top panel: ε=9.53, γ=0.19; Bottom panel: ε=9.53, γ= 0 . 1 9,D rr=42 km.
Benchmark parameter values: µ=0.3, η=200, δ=0.1
To put our results into perspective, in the Appendix we estimate a simple market potential
function to get some idea about what the centre regions are in our sample of EU+ regions. We
list 39 regions with the highest market potential (we stopped when London entered the list),
this is, of course, rather ad-hoc but it nevertheless gives an indication as to what Figure 3
implies. For these 39 centre regions, the average distance to each other is 309 km. (of these23
regions, the region Limburg in Belgium has the lowest average distance to the other 38
regions: 220 km.). Set against Figure 3 these distances imply that on average agglomeration
forces emanating from a centre region r are too small or weak to affect other centre regions.
Another way to illustrate our results is to take one particular region like the “most central”
region, Limburg in Belgium (with Drr=18.5 km.), or the region with highest market potential,
Nordrhein Westfalen in Germany (with Drr=69.4 km.), and to calculate for these individual
regions their threshold distance Drs. Also for these 2 regions the spatial strength of
agglomeration forces is such that only a very limited number of the other 38 regions are
affected. For the region of Nordrhein Westfalen for instance, 7 (14) other regions fall within
the reach of Nordrhein Westfalen, that is have a distance to Nordrhein Westfalen that is lower





To understand what we do and do not claim, it is important to be clear as to what we have
done. For our sample of NUTSII regions, we estimate the wage equation (7’) and this helps us
to arrive at the free-ness of trade parameter for any region r with distances Drs and Drr.O n c e
we do this we can derive region-specific free-ness of trade parameters. The NEG theory (the
Tomahawk and Bell Shaped curve) gives us the break-points, but only for the case of 2
regions. Solutions for these break points for the case of n>2 only exist for the case where
distance is normalized (this is an innocent assumption to make as long as n=2 but no longer so
when n>2 because it means assuming equidistant regions).
14
Using our estimates for the substitution elasticity and the distance parameter from Table 1 we
can calculate implied threshold distances between regions r and s at which a break point
occurs. This implied distance is shown in Figure 3, and gives an idea about the geographical
reach of agglomeration forces. Or stated differently, these differences "indicate how far the
agglomeration forces emanating from a region extend across space" (Crozet, 2004, p. 454).
14 Suppose that we stick to the assumption of equidistant regions for n>2, then it can be shown (Puga, 1999,
Appendix), that the number of regions (n) enters the break conditions (8) and (9) as an additional parameter. For
a large number of regions, like our sample of NUTS II regions, the result is that when n increases φ
B ≈0, which
means that the corresponding threshold distance Drsalso approaches zero km. This would mean that for any real
distance Drs between any pair of regions we are always in the agglomeration regime. Symmetry is no longer
viable (which is not very surprising in the sense that symmetry, every region having exactly a share of 1/n of the
footloose production, is a rather stringent condition when n is large). Besides, it is not clear how to call an
equilibrium in which n-1 regions have the same share of the manufacturing production but the n
th region is
larger: is this symmetry or agglomeration? Most importantly, however, the underlying assumption of equidistant
regions is hard to maintain for n>2 to start with. If one wants to analyse the long run equilibria and the associated
break points for n>2 regions, analytical solutions do not exist and one has to restore to simulations which also
has clear drawbacks.24
For a region r with an internal distance of Drr, we arrive at the threshold distance Drs at which
the balance between agglomerating and spreading forces changes sign. We thereby establish
in Figure 3 for any region r for both NEG models the radius (measured by Drs) within which
agglomeration or spreading forces dominate. This is of course a partial analysis. An
alternative approach would be to confront our estimation from Table 1 with a NEG model and
corresponding break-points for n regions, where n is the number of NUTSII regions. The
difficulty with such a strategy is that we have to rely on simulations since no analytical
solutions thus exist (or make sense) for the break-points in case of n>2 regions (see footnote
14).
Choosing between models and some sub-sample estimations
The discussion so far begs the question, which of the two models is the most relevant. A
priori, our preference is with the second class of NEG models, in which labor is not mobile
between regions. It implies less extreme agglomeration patterns (compare Figures 1 and 2).
This seems more in line with the stylized facts for the EU and elsewhere. These models also
incorporate the stylised fact that labour mobility is larger within countries than between
countries. Having said this, we cannot dismiss the first of class of NEG models out of hand
for basically three reasons:
•  Both models assume wage flexibility. With wage rigidity (Faini, 1999, Puga, 2002) we
return to the Tomahawk Figure because agglomeration by definition does not lead to a
wage differential between regions and there will be no thus wage gap (and even no
wage cost differential) between core and peripheral regions.
•  Wage rigidity is larger within EU countries than between EU countries, this might be
relevant in deciding which (regions versus countries) which NEG model is relevant.
•  Even though interregional labour mobility is relatively low in the EU (compared to for
instance the USA), labour mobility is higher within than between countries and this
might be relevant in deciding which class of NEG models applies for what
geographical scale. Also, with increasing economic integration in the EU
interregional labor mobility might increase in the future which might make the world
of the Tomahawk curve more relevant.
Given the stylised facts on wage rigidity and labor (im)mobility within the EU, does this
mean that the “bleak conclusions” of the tomahawk model as to the impact of ongoing
economic integration on agglomeration are pervasive? No, not necessarily. One can think of25
alternative congestion forces for core regions besides higher wages that also give rise to a
bell-shaped curve even with (!) interregional labour mobility. The best example is due to
Helpman (1998) and Hanson (2001) where instead of immobile workers (a non-traded input)
we have a non-traded consumption good, in their case housing but one think of various non-
traded services of which the price rises when agglomeration increases. This can be looked
upon as agglomeration costs. Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) show that such a non-
traded good may act as a powerful dispersion force that may act a brake on agglomeration.
15
Finally, and partly inspired by the relevance of the workings of the labour market, we checked
whether our estimation results and hence the conclusions with respect to the implied free-ness
of trade φ would change if we (i) changed the sample period; (ii) estimated wage equation (7’)
for a sub-set of countries. To start with the first issue, recall that the estimation results in
Table 1 are based on a pooled estimation for all EU regions for the period 1992-2000. We
also estimated wage equation (7’) for each of these years separately. Assuming that the degree
of economic integration in the EU, if anything, increased during the 1990s, one might expect
the degree of competition as measured by the mark-up of price over marginal cost, ε/(ε-1), to
fall and thus the substitution elasticity ε to fall overt time. Similarly, one might expect the
distance parameter γ to fall during these years. It turns out that, however, that both
substitution elasticity and the distance parameter hardly change over time. This also means
that the implied free-ness of trade parameter hardly changes over time. For our preferred
estimation procedure (WLS, 2SLS) for instance, we got (t-value between brackets) for ε a
coeffcient of 10.1 (11.4) and 8.9 (10.8) for respectively the period 1992-1995 and 1997-2000,
and similarly for γ a coeffcient of 0.18 (14.5) and 0.20 (14.4).
As indicated above, the degree of interregional labor mobility and wage flexibility is
important in deciding which of the 2 models is more relevant. National labour market
institutions are important determinants of labor mobility and wage flexibility and these
institutions differ markedly between EU countries. In corporatist countries for instance there
is coordination of wage bargaining with relatively little room for interregional wage
differences and, if anything, interregional labour market adjustments have to realized through
labor mobility. Relatively, that is to say compared to non-corporatist countries where there is
15 The key here for the possibility of (renewed) spreading at low trade costs (a large φ) arises in NEG models
when the strength of the spreading or congestion forces do not fall when trade costs fall: “with any (…)
congestion force unrelated to trade costs, the equilibrium pattern of location will return to dispersion for some
(low) trade costs threshold” (Head and Mayer, 2004a, p.2652)26
ceteris paribus more room for interregional wage differences. This would imply that the
tomahawk (bell curve) model seems more relevant for corporatist (non-corporatist) countries.
We have therefore also estimated wage equation (7’) for the period 1992-2000 for a group of
corporatist countries (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and
Ireland) as well as for a group of non-corporatist countries (UK, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy
and Greece).
16 For both groups the estimation results for ε and γ are such that the relative
threshold distances Drs/Drr that correspond to the three φ break points (given the estimates for
ε and γ),s e eF i g u r e3 ,a r en e a r l yt h es a m ea st h o s es h o w ni nF i g u r e3 .A l s o ,u s i n go t h e r
criteria to split the sample into groups of countries, like the size of countries (area per km
2),
showed that our conclusions w.r.t. the implied relative threshold distance, as shown by Figure
3, are quite robust.
6 Bilateral country trade flows and sector φ’s
Our estimations are based on aggregate data for each NUTSII region. That is to say, we did
not use regional data on the distribution of wages, valued added or other variables for the
various sectors in a region. The reason is simply that these data are not available at the NUTS
II level. In order to arrive at an “educated guess” what the free-ness of trade parameter could
look like for various manufacturing sectors for the EU, we follow Head and Mayer (2004a).
They explain that the free-ness of trade parameter can be approximated through the use of
bilateral trade and production data. These data are available at the country level (and, not at
the EU regional level). Based on Head and Ries (2001), they define a very simple estimator






where the numerator denotes the imports of country i from country j and vice versa; the
denominator denotes for both country i and country j the value of all shipments of a industry
minus the sum of shipments to all other countries (Head and Mayer, 2004a, p. 2618)
If the bilateral trade between these 2 countries is relatively important (unimportant), φtrade is
relativey high (low): 0<φtrade<1. The advantage of this “estimator” for the free-ness of trade
parameter is that no actual estimations are required. Head and Mayer calculate φtradefor 21
industries and two country pairs (Canada/USA and France/Germany) for 1995 and then
confront their implied free-ness of trade parameter with industry-specific bell curves. These
are derived by plugging in industry-specific values for the respective parameters in the break
16 The classification is based on Schramm (1999).27
condition (9).
17 The main result is that, almost without exception, for each of the 21 industries
φtrade is rather low (in the range of 0.1-0.2) to the effect that for both pairs of countries most
industries are still to the left of the bell-part: that is, φtrade<φ
B
low.
We applied Head and Mayer’s methodology for the case of the EU to see how our results
compared to their findings and also to see if our main conclusions from the previous section
carry over to the sector level. In our first experiment we took Germany as our benchmark
country and paired Germany with 3 other EU countries (Spain, UK, and the Netherlands) and
with a new EU member (Poland). Using as much as possible the Head and Mayer sector
classification (see Table 4 below) we calculated φtrade for the 4 country pairs for the years
1985, 1990, 1994 and 1998. For the first 3 years we used World Bank data and for 1998 we
used the OECD STAN data. Data for Poland were only available for 1990 and 1994. In line
with the findings by Head and Mayer, the respective values for our φtrade gradually increase
over time but they remain relatively low. Only for a few sectors we came up with a φtrade that
exceeds the break point φ
B
low in the bell-curve model and φlabmob in the tomahawk case. The
sectors with agglomeration in some years are clothing, wood, plastics and drugs, ferrous
metals, and transport. The overall picture is, however, one of a “pre-agglomeration” degree of
economic integration (results not shown here but available upon request).
Our second experiment was to compute φtrade for the bilateral sector trade between the group
of 15 EU countries versus the group of 10 accession countries, the new EU members from
central and eastern Europe. Based on GTAP data for 1997, Table 3 gives the computed free-
ness of trade parameter φtrade and compares this implied degree of economic integration with
the two break-points φ
B
low (the bell-curve model) as well as with φlabmob (the tomahawk
model). The parameter values needed for the derivation of these 2 break-points for the
various manufacturing sectors are taken from Head and Mayer (2004a, Appendix). For “non-
manufacturing sectors” agriculture, energy and services such a theoretical benchmark was not
readily available. For the manufacturing sectors the overall conclusion must be that the degree
of economic integration for most sectors is such that we are not (yet) in the agglomeration
regime. The exceptions are (see the scores in bold) Plastics and Drugs, Ferrous Metals, and
Vehicles. However, even for these 3 sectors the free-ness of trade parameter is such that these
17 For the data-sets and the actual values used to come up with industry specific measures for the intermediate
input share, the labour supply elasticity, the share of manufacturing gods in total expenditure, and the
substitution elasticity for manufactures (a.k.a. the increasing returns parameter) see Head and Mayer (2004a, pp.
2664-2665).28
sectors are only at the start of the upward sloping part of the bell-curve (see the respective
φbell-top values which gives the peak of the bell-curve for these sectors).
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Table 3 Sector-specific free-ness of trade





1 Agriculture 0.027 NA NA
2 Energy 0,012 NA NA
3 FoodBevTobacco 0.047 0.46 0.22
4 Clothing 0.1355 0.21 0.18
5 Wood 0.046 0.39 0.36
6 Paper 0.033 0.17 0.16
10/8 Plastics and Drugs 0,127 0.109
* 0.104
9 Petro 0.017 symm 0.71
11 Minerals 0.036 0.47 0.44
12 Ferrous metals 0.038 0.0
** aggl
13 Non-ferrous metals 0.029 0.09 0.06
14 Fab. Metals 0.050 symm 0.69
15/16 Machinery (and Computers) 0.253 0.43 0.36
17 Electrical 0.090 0.67 0.39
19/20 Ships/railroad/transport
*** 0.0112 0.46 0.39
21 Vehicles 0.132 0.10
**** 0.08
23 Instruments 0.0155 0.57 0.45
18 Services 0.162 NA NA
* φbell-top=0.545; ** φbell-top=0.50;
**** φbell-top=0.49
***=based on railroad which has lowest φ
B of these 3 sectors in Head and Mayer, 2004a
NA=not available; symm= local stability of symmetric equilbria for all values of φ;
aggl= only full agglomeration stable.
In our view the results in Table 3 with a free-ness of trade parameter based on bilateral trade
data on the country level are in line with our calculations of φ for the case of the NUTS II
regions. In the previous section it was only for regions that are relatively near to each other (in
terms of Drs/Drr), that we found it possible to come up with implied values for φ that clearly
exceeded the φ break-points for our two benchmark NEG models.
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low φ φ +
￿ Compared to our calculations for the 3 break points in the previous section, the most notable difference is that
in Table 4 φ
B
labmob is on average larger. This is mainly due to the fact that Head and Mayer assume that the share
of manufactured goods (which in their case refers to the share of the goods produced by a specific sector only) is
smaller that the benchmark of δ=0.1 that we used in the previous section (a lower δ ceteris paribus means weaker
agglomeration forces).29
7 Conclusions
The estimation of the equilibrium wage equation from a model by Puga (1999) for the EU
NUTSII regions yielded information on the so called free-ness of trade parameter, the NEG
variable that stands for the degree of economic integration. The confrontation of the estimated
free-ness of trade parameter with our two theoretical benchmarks as to the relationship
between economic integration and agglomeration led us to conclude that the agglomeration
regime is only relevant for regions that are relatively close to each other. At least in our 2
region setting, agglomeration seems to be a rather localized phenomenon. This last conclusion
was substantiated by free-ness of trade estimations based on bilateral trade data on the EU
country level.
Where does this leave us? In our view the main findings of this paper are in line with the
notion that agglomeration in the EU seems to be most relevant at lower geographical scales.
Our findings are also in line with related studies like Davis and Weinstein (1999), Forslid et
al. (2002), Midelfart et al. (2003), Head and Mayer (2004a) and, also in terms of the
methodology employed, Crozet (2004). The relevance of the proximity of agglomeration
effects is also underlined by Brülhart, Crozet, and Koenig (2004) w.r.t the impact of the EU
enlargement and its impact on incumbent EU regions. In their survey Head and Mayer
(2004a) conclude that it seems that agglomeration forces are very localized, unable to
generate core-periphery patterns in Europe at a large geographical level at least as long as
labor remains so sensitive to migration costs. Our results back up this conclusion and they
also show that if the degree of interregional labor mobility would increase (in our terms a
move from the Bell Curve towards the Tomahawk) that the geographical reach of
agglomeration forces would increase. Finally, and this must be emphasized, even though we
have gone at some length to take the NEG theory seriously empirically, these are very much
preliminary results. Clearly, more research is needed in order to tell which NEG model is the
most relevant at which geographical scale for the EU. As such, our results are very much
illustrations of the potential empirical relevance of the NEG approach. Nevertheless, the main
findings are interesting because they constitute, to our knowledge, one of the first attempts to
confront estimations of the key structural NEG model parameters with theoretical NEG
predictions as to how economic integration may impact upon the spatial distribution of
economic activity. There is much that can be done to improve upon our initial findings. In this
respect the NEG approach needs to be taken even more seriously. Two avenues of research
come to mind. The first one is to come up with NEG models that incorporate key features like30
the difference between interregional and international labor mobility within a single model
(see Behrens et al., 2003, Crozet and Koenig, 2002). This might lead to additional testable
hypotheses that allow for a better choice between various NEG agglomeration mechanisms.
The second one is simply to engage in better testing by making use of (econometric) insights
from outside NEG proper and by making use of new (micro) data sets that are increasingly
becoming available (Fingleton, 2004, Combes and Overman, 2003).
APPENDIX
Data Description
Nominal wage is defined as compensation of employees per worker (NUTS 2-level, except
for Germany –NUTS I).
The measure of regional purchasing power is gross value added (all sectors). Time series are
nominalised by using the GVA-series of Cambridge Econometrics, which are denominated in
euro’s of 1995, and the price deflator of national GDP (AMECO-database).
In the RMA we included the NUTS II-regions of EU14 (=EU15 excluding Luxembourg) +
Norway, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Switzerland. MPL (marginal labor productivity)
is proxied by real gross value added per employee. EU+= EU14 (= EU excluding
Luxembourg) + Norway, Switzerland, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic. For the
approximation of the price index Ir see the appendix.
For wages we used the EU14 only. All wage, income and production data are taken from The
European Regional Database (summer 2002 version) from Cambridge Econometrics.
Distance is in km.
A set of additional control variables for each NUTS II region that potentially consists of mean
annual sunshine; mean elevation above sea-level; and dummy variables (country dummy,
border-region dummy, access to sea dummy, access to navigable waterway dummy). The
variables mean annual sunshine radiation in kWh/m² (sunshine) and mean elevation above
sea-level in metres are taken from the SPESP database (see
http://www.mcrit.com/SPESP/SPESP_reg_ind_final%20report.htm ).
Introducing regional factor productivity differences in the model with intermediate inputs
Free entry and exit and the use of the zero-profit condition leads to the equilibrium output for
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The point to notice is here is that the marginal input requirement βir is now region specific
which means that factor productivity can differ between regions. Suppose the regional factor
productivity gap can be approximated by the difference in marginal labour productivity in
region r and the average of the marginal labour productivity for the EU NUTS II regions
We define MPLEU+/MPLir=βir
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where Trs is transport costs, and I is the price index of manufactures.
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where Ir=[ (Trs ps)
1-ε]
1/(1-ε)
The log transformation of this expression results in the log transformation of wage equation
(7), equation (7’) in the main text:



































The productivity gap βr is thus measured as MPLEU+/MPLr=βr
To really be able to estimate this specification of the wage equation we finally need to
approximate the price index I
How to Approximate the Price Index I?
For the model without intermediate inputs (µ=0), we do so as follows:
For each region we focus on two prices: the price in district r of a manufactured good
produced in district r and the average price outside district r of a manufactured good
produced outside district r. The determination of the simplified local price index for
manufactures requires a measure of distance between region r and the regions outside. The
distance from the economic center is an appropriate measure in our view. This center is
obtained by weighing the distances with relative Y. Here we make use of the estimation
results based for a simple market-potential function for our sample of EU NUTSII regions.
Regions with largest market-potential MP, see Table A1, are considered to be centres where






rs e Y MP
2 log
κ
Table A1Regions with largest Market Potential, 1995 data (in descending order of market potential)








































The distance between a region r and the nearest center region (out of the list of the 35 regions
with the largest MP for the NUTSII regions, see Table A1) gives us Tr, center in the equation
below:
() () []
ε ε ε λ λ
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where r W is the average wage outside district r,a n dw e i g h tλ r is region r’s share of
employment in manufacturing, which is proportional to the number of varieties of
manufactures (λ is proxied by (regional employment) / (EU+employment)).
This simplified price index makes it possible to directly estimate our specification of the wage
equation with factor productivity differences and without intermediate inputs.
The productivity gap between EU regions and the EU average also affects the price index
equation, because marginal costs changes into (with µ=0):
MCir = Wirβ ir,
and so the simplified price index equation finally becomes –dropping subscript i:33
() () []
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− − − − + = center r r r r r r T W W I .
Now we are ready and our specification for the wage equation from the main text for the case
of µ=0 and hence with the above approximation for the price index.
For the model with intermediate inputs this “trick” to approximate the price index, now the
price index for intermediates, will not do as easily. The reason is that the equilibrium price
index is now not only a function of wages but also of itself:
(3’’)





















This follows directly from the fact that we now have two factors of production (labour and the










As a result the equilibrium price index, the summation of the price each firm charges
corrected for distance (the suppliers access variable), is a function of both the wage W and the
price index I.34
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